Published by Ruia Associates
For over a century and a half, “sedition” under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 occupied a contested space in Indian criminal law. With the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) coming into force on 1 July 2024, the word “sedition” has disappeared from the statute book. In its place stands Section 152, framed not around “disaffection towards the Government” but around acts that endanger the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India.
At Ruia Associates, we view this not as a cosmetic substitution but as a shift in legal framing that practitioners, businesses, journalists, and citizens must understand and cite with care. The change in language carries real consequences for how the offence is charged, defended, and interpreted.
The Old Framework: Section 124A IPC
Section 124A IPC criminalised exciting, or attempting to excite, “disaffection towards the Government established by law.” The provision was colonial in origin and the subject of sustained constitutional scrutiny. Its modern boundaries were drawn largely by the judiciary rather than the text itself. In Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the provision but read it down significantly, limiting its application to speech with a tendency to incite violence or public disorder, and protecting strong criticism of the government that fell short of that threshold.
In May 2022, in the S.G. Vombatkere proceedings, the Supreme Court effectively kept Section 124A in abeyance, directing that pending and fresh cases be held in suspension pending re-examination, after acknowledging concerns about widespread misuse.
The New Framework: Section 152 BNS
Section 152 of the BNS recharacterises the offence. As reproduced in legal commentary, it penalises a person who “purposely or knowingly, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or by electronic communication or by use of financial means, or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite secession or armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encourages feelings of separatist activities or endangers sovereignty or unity and integrity of India.”
The punishment is imprisonment for life, or imprisonment which may extend to seven years, along with a fine.
Three features distinguish the new framing from the old:
First, the conceptual anchor has moved. The offence is no longer about loyalty or “disaffection” toward the government as an institution; it targets conduct said to threaten the nation’s sovereignty, unity, and integrity. This is a meaningful reorientation in language and, potentially, in constitutional positioning.
Second, the enumerated conduct is broader. The section expressly lists secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities, and separatist feelings. The term “subversive activities” in particular is undefined and open to wide interpretation.
Third, the section modernises the modes of commission. It explicitly captures “electronic communication” and “use of financial means,” bringing social media posts, messaging platforms, and crowdfunding squarely within its potential reach, areas the 1860 text never contemplated.
Section 152 also carries an explanation clarifying that comments expressing disapproval of government measures, with a view to obtaining their alteration by lawful means, do not constitute an offence, provided they do not excite the activities the section targets. This mirrors, in statutory form, part of what Kedarnath Singh achieved through judicial reading.
What Has Actually Changed, and What Practitioners Must Cite Carefully
The central point of caution is this: Section 152 BNS is not simply “sedition renamed.” Citing the two provisions interchangeably is inaccurate. The ingredients, the protected interest, the punishment, and the modes of commission differ. A pleading, advisory, or article that treats Section 124A case law as automatically governing Section 152 risks overstating settled law.
At the same time, much of the established sedition jurisprudence remains highly relevant. Early High Court engagement with Section 152 suggests the courts intend to carry forward the safeguards developed under the old regime. In Tejender Pal Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2024), the Rajasthan High Court observed that Section 152 traces its genesis to Section 124A and cautioned against deploying it to curb peaceful or legitimate criticism, insisting on a real nexus between the speech and a likelihood of rebellion, secession, or comparable harm.
For accurate citation, we suggest practitioners keep the following distinctions in mind:
- The statutory source is now Section 152 BNS, 2023, effective 1 July 2024, not Section 124A IPC. Offences committed before that date are governed by the IPC.
- The punishment has increased at the upper end of the lower bracket, from a maximum of three years under Section 124A to a maximum of seven years (or life) under Section 152, with fine.
- Kedarnath Singh and its progeny are persuasive on the underlying free-speech balance but were decided under different statutory language. They should be cited as guiding principle, not as direct construction of Section 152.
- New interpretive questions, especially the meaning of “subversive activities” and the scope of “financial means,” remain open and will be settled only as a body of BNS-specific case law develops.
The Constitutional Backdrop
Whatever the label, the offence continues to operate at the intersection of national security and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The vagueness of terms such as “subversive activities” raises familiar concerns about chilling effects on legitimate dissent, and it is likely that Section 152 will face constitutional challenge much as Section 124A did. Until the higher judiciary, and very likely the Supreme Court, speaks definitively, the line between protected criticism and criminal conduct will continue to be drawn case by case.
Practical Guidance from Ruia Associates
For clients navigating this space, whether media organisations, content platforms, civil-society bodies, or individuals, our guidance is threefold. Treat Section 152 as a distinct provision with its own ingredients, not a continuation of 124A by another name. Recognise that digital communication and financial support now sit expressly within the offence’s reach, which raises the compliance and risk profile for online publishers and funders. And in any advisory or litigation, cite the framework precisely, distinguishing settled sedition principle from the as-yet-unsettled construction of the new section.
The transition from sedition to sovereignty is more than a change of vocabulary. It is a re-drawing of the offence that demands careful, accurate engagement.
This article is intended for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. For advice specific to your circumstances, please contact Ruia Associates.
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